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Abstract. In his article, The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—Then and
Now, Richard Epstein argues that rather than urge courts and regulators to apply antitrust
law to labor markets, reformers who care about labor market competition should try to
constrain unions. In this reply, I argue that Epstein’s assumptions about labor market
structure are contradicted by mountains of empirical evidence. The anticompetitive
behavior of employers causes significant harm to social welfare—both in terms of
economic output and equity. Antitrust law is a valuable tool for addressing America’s
ailing labor markets.
In his article, The Application of Antitrust Law to Labor Markets—Then and Now,2
Richard Epstein pours cold water on the recent efforts to strengthen antitrust enforcement in
labor markets, arguing that reform should focus on curtailing the power of unions rather than
enhancing antitrust law. As his fusillade is aimed partly at my recently published book, How
Antitrust Failed Workers, I write this response to take issue with several of his empirical and
normative claims. I also argue that an invigorated antitrust law, focused on labor markets, is
more consistent with the classical liberal tenets that Epstein has famously championed than the
pro-big business ideological position implicit in Epstein’s article. It also has much to offer other
ideological strains that are ascendant in American politics, including progressivism and populist
conservatism.
Epstein’s view of antitrust law reflects the skeptical take associated with the Chicagoschool tradition.3 He believes that antitrust law should be used sparingly, mainly to counter the
worst forms of abuse like price-fixing. While he sees a role for antitrust law in blocking mergers
that would result in significant market concentration, he believes that markets are generally
efficient—they tend to correct themselves because monopoly profits attract entry and
technological change disrupts collusion—and that antitrust law is a crude way to correct markets
even when they fall short. In Epstein’s view, the real threat to competition comes not from
businesses but from workers who organize unions, and politicians who meddle with labor
markets. Epstein believes that unions push wages above the competitive level, disrupt commerce,
squelch growth, and discourage innovation like charter schools.
This view at one time enjoyed a high degree of influence but it is looking worse for wear
these days. Numerous studies suggest that market concentration and accompanying price
markups increased substantially over the last forty years of Chicago-school dominance of the
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courts and regulators.4 Not all economists blame lax antitrust enforcement.5 But there was never
much evidence for the Chicago view, and the recent evidence that it has not improved
competition, and may have worsened it, has prompted an overdue reassessment of antitrust law.6
But my concern here is not antitrust law in general, but its role in countering labor
monopsony, as is Epstein’s as well. In my book, How Antitrust Failed Workers,7 I argue (1) that
labor monopsony, caused by concentration and other frictions, is a real problem for public
policy; (2) that antitrust law formally applies to many labor market abuses; (3) that a “litigation
gap” prevails, as antitrust law is used in product markets vastly more often, and with vastly more
success, than in labor markets; (4) that this litigation gap cannot be justified by differences
between labor markets and product markets; and (5) therefore regulators and courts should use
antitrust law to address labor monopsony, and Congress should consider reforms.
Epstein does not contest (2) or (3), so I will not repeat the arguments here. Let me then
focus on the other claims.
Is labor monopsony a real problem? At one time, many economists believed that labor
markets were competitive, or anyway competitive enough that government intervention was
rarely warranted. That view has lost favor. Study after study has provided evidence of labor
monopsony, including studies that show that employees are not sensitive to wage changes, that
minimum wage laws do not usually result in disemployment, that higher levels of concentration
are associated with lower wages, that wages are dispersed rather than uniform for workers of
equal productivity, and that mergers that concentrate labor markets reduce wages.8 A recent
meta-analysis, published after my book, looks at 1,320 estimates of firm-level labor elasticity in
53 studies, and finds, after controlling for a range of factors including publication bias, that “the
literature provides strong evidence for monopsonistic competition and implies sizable
markdowns in wages.”9 While the authors’ estimate of firm-level labor elasticity is higher than
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that of many of the studies they evaluate, their estimate reflects market-wide conditions, meaning
that some markets will exhibit even lower elasticities while others are reasonably competitive.
Not all labor market frictions can be addressed by antitrust law, which is more concerned
with concentration than with other frictions like search costs and job differentiation. But here the
studies of Azar et al., Benmelich et al, and Rinz, leave little doubt that extremely high levels of
concentration are common.10 Azar et al., for example, estimate that 60% of labor markets are
characterized by HHIs higher than 2,500, and a quarter of labor markets have HHIs higher than
an eye-watering 7,200.11 These high levels of HHIs suggest that mergers will often suppress
wages, and that is indeed the findings of three recent studies.12 A nice real-world illustration is a
recent hospital merger in Abilene, Texas, involving a hospital with 70.1% of the market of
registered nurses and a hospital with 22.4% of the market of registered nurses. The Texas Health
and Human Services Commission granted a certificate of public advantage to the merged
hospital system even though it would result in single-firm control of 92.6% of the market of
registered nurses, as the FTC pointed out in a public comment opposing the merger.13 Or, in
terms of HHI, an already absurdly concentrated market (HHI north of 5,300) was taken to near
black-hole level of more than 8,500.
Epstein does not cite academic work that provides evidence that labor markets are
competitive.14 He simply asserts without citation that “[m]ost labor markets operate largely on
competitive principles”15 except where unions exist and laws intervene to protect workers. He
repeats the Chicago-school canard that when monopoly rents exist, “savvy entrepreneurs” will
enter the market in order to capture a portion of them,16 ignoring decades of literature that shows
how incumbents can block or buy out those potential entrants.17 The only empirical evidence he
cites are turnover rates and the existence of a “labor shortage” in the middle of a pandemic.18 But
turnover rates in isolation do not indicate the presence of labor market competition;19 moreover,
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while Epstein insists that turnover rates are “high,” he does not provide any basis for thinking
that the numbers are high rather than low. As for the current labor shortage, many factors are
involved, but it is fully consistent with monopsonistic labor markets. Businesses have faced a
spike in demand since the pandemic downturn. In a competitive labor market, they would raise
wages to attract additional workers so as to ramp up production. Instead, they have kept wages
low or raised them only a small amount, which is the profit-maximizing strategy for labor
monopsonists who accept reductions in output relative to the competitive ideal in order to
minimize labor costs.
Epstein also argues that the labor monopsony theory is inconsistent with the economic
good times that we have supposedly been enjoying until the pandemic brought an end to the
party. He points to high stock market returns, but the high stock returns over a handful of years
can mean lots of things, and certainly do not refute the labor monopsony hypothesis. Labor
monopsony causes a transfer of wealth from labor to capital, and thus should lead to higher stock
market returns, which mostly accrue to the wealthy at the expense of workers in monopsonized
markets. Epstein also cites household income figures, which have been rising.20 But taken in
isolation, they also tell us nothing. Labor monopsonists choose the wage where marginal revenue
product equals marginal cost. Rising worker productivity over time will thus result in higher
wages over time even if all employers are monopsonists. Whether household income is rising,
falling, or steady, it is lower in a labor market characterized by monopsony or monopsonistic
competition than it would be in a competitive labor market. In any event, the consensus view is
that over several decades labor’s share of income has dropped steadily, though not necessarily
because of a rise in labor monopsony; more likely, the decline of union density is the culprit.21
Economic growth has also stagnated over the last few decades, consistent again with monopsony
(as well as monopoly), which lowers output.22
Is the litigation gap justified? While Epstein does not address this question directly, he
plainly believes that the litigation gap does not imply antitrust underenforcement in labor
markets as I do. Epstein surveys the legal landscape and argues that antitrust litigation aimed at
horizontal collusion in labor markets may be justified but he appears to be skeptical that such
dispersion, which economists agree is evidence against competitive labor markets. Bhaskar et al., supra at 156 (“The
existence of substantial wage dispersion among workers of very similar quality suggests that labor market
imperfections are important and inevitably give employers some oligopsony power”).
20
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collusion is common; that antitrust litigation aimed at covenants not to compete is unnecessary
because common law regulation is sufficient; and that review of mergers for labor market effects
may be justified but is usually unnecessary as product-side review will normally catch mergers
that produce adverse labor-market effects.23 The overall impression, then, is that the status quo is
sufficient.
The frequency with which collusion takes place in labor markets is an open question.
Conspirators do not announce their conspiracies; conspiracies must be uncovered through
painstaking investigation, often with the help of whistleblowers. For a long time, some
economists and lawyers were skeptical that product market collusion took place with any
frequency.24 But after investigative resources were ramped up, numerous conspiracies—many of
them complex, and international—came to light.25 There is a good theoretical reason to believe
that labor market collusion is common: because rational profit-maximizing CEOs know that the
government criminally enforces the antitrust laws in product markets while mostly ignoring labor
markets, and money is money whether it comes from labor market rents or product market rents,
they ought to exploit labor markets rather than product markets on the margin. Since the Justice
Department announced that it would begin criminal investigations of labor market collusion in
2016, it has brought three indictments, all just in the last year.26 The Kreuger and Aschenfelter
analysis of franchise no-poach agreements shows that they were extremely common, used by
58% of major franchise brands, who collectively employed many millions of workers.27 A
number of private actions have also been brought in recent years.28 The evidence thus suggests
that labor market collusion is occurring, but we will have to wait before we know the magnitude
of the problem.
With respect to covenants not to compete, several studies indicate that they do suppress
wages, contrary to Epstein’s claims.29 How is this possible in light of common law regulation?
The answer is that common law regulation varies across states, and in some states it is quite
light; that common law regulation does not address marketwide impacts as antitrust law does,
and so will tolerate noncompetes that cartelize labor markets but that do not cause significant
harm to the worker in question; and, most important, that the common law sanction is
23
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exceedingly weak—nonenforcement, while in some states courts will merely whittle down an
overbroad noncompete to an acceptable size. Employers are clearly not intimidated by the law.
Statistics showing that a vast number of low-skill workers are subject to noncompetes, which are
almost certainly not enforceable, along with evidence that the wages of those workers are
suppressed in states with high levels of noncompete enforcement, indicate that the noncompetes
operate through an in terrorem effect. Only highly compensated employees can afford lawyers to
contest noncompetes in court, and so everyone else doesn’t.
Nor is it correct that blocking mergers that cause excessive product-market concentration
will necessarily, or even usually, address concerns about labor market concentration. Product
markets and labor markets are different markets. They are rarely coextensive in area: labor
markets are almost always local; product markets are frequently national. And even when they
are coextensive, merger defenses will rarely be the same for product markets and labor markets.
Product market concentration that may be acceptable because the merged firm obtains economies
of scale in production may nonetheless be unacceptable because no efficiencies justify labor
market concentration.
Epstein is correct that labor markets are generally smaller than product markets, and that
therefore review of labor market effects will often be more administratively burdensome than
review of product market effects. But the government already reviews mergers for their product
market effects in local markets—as it must, if it is to estimate the impact of a merger of national
chains that operate drug stores, restaurants, and other venues that serve local markets. The
government also reviews many hospital mergers even though they usually impact local product
markets. When mergers affect multiple product markets, as they often do, the government
analyzes every impact in every product market that is substantially affected; why should it not
look at labor markets, where harms and impacts can be greater?
Does antitrust law need reform to address labor monopsony? Epstein says no, and
instead that reformers should oppose unions and licensing laws. My view is that antitrust law
does not necessarily need legislative reform. The law is capacious enough already to address
labor market abuses. Contrary to the views of some, the consumer welfare standard in antitrust
law does not block claims by workers. Nor must workers who bring claims to block mergers and
other practices prove that a remedy will benefit consumers. While every case produces winners
and losers, antitrust applied evenhandedly to labor markets and product markets will, over time,
benefit nearly everyone.
But only if regulators and courts take the right steps to enforce the law. I am more
optimistic about the regulators than the courts. Regulators have shown a willingness to rethink
legal interpretations and regulatory priorities in light of the new wisdom.30 The courts have the
unenviable task of using the pinched interpretations of antitrust law by the Supreme Court to
30
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address a new set of practices with which they have little experience. To set them in the right
direction, legislative reform may well be necessary. 31
Epstein argues that reforms should focus on labor law rather than antitrust law; he argues
that labor organization causes grievous harm. My interest is antitrust law, and so I will not
attempt to refute him. But his focus on unions seems odd at the present moment. The massive
decline of union density in the United States from the 1950s to the present, and the fact that his
decline coincides with slowing GDP growth, increasing inequality, and a decline in labor’s share
of income,32 suggests that a further battering of labor organization should not be at the top of the
list even for libertarians if they are concerned about the health of the economy and the strength
of the social fabric. Moreover, there is no evidence, as far as I am aware, that the union wage
premium results in wages above the competitive rate. Given the prevalence of labor monopsony,
the wage premium more likely pushes wages toward but not above the competitive rate, thus
enhancing rather than reducing the efficiency of labor markets.
***
Labor monopsony is a problem, one that has received little attention from policymakers,
legal academics, and even economists until recently. The problem is a difficult one, requiring
different forms of legal intervention. Antitrust is not a panacea. But it is part of the solution. And
it is an approach—rare in modern times—that should appeal to a broad range of ideological or
political persuasions.
Start with the progressives. They are concerned about the political and economic power
of big business; inequality; and the exploitation of labor. Labor-side antitrust should appeal to
them because it offers a tool against those big businesses that benefit from labor market power; it
should push up wages at the expense of capital; and it should therefore reduce inequality, as most
people depend on their wages for their income and few people outside the upper middle-class
and the wealthy invest in the stock market. While some progressives are skeptical about markets,
and thus a bit alarmed that antitrust law helps workers by improving labor markets,33 they should
at least see the law as tactically useful in the larger ideological battle.
Conservatives in the Trump years have exhibited a new concern about big business,
which they accuse of imposing liberal values on workers and consumers, and about the plight of
working-class and rural workers who have not benefited from economic growth for years. As
they are reluctant to endorse an expansion of the social safety net and more progressive taxes,
they should at least insist that antitrust law be used to protect workers as well as consumers. That
labor-side antitrust enforcement should also increase output and unchain market forces should
also please the remnants of the free-market wing of the Republican party.
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And that brings us to the classical liberals. Adam Smith, the classical liberal par
excellence, displayed an attitude toward labor markets that is like night and day compared with
Epstein’s:
We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters [employers], though
frequently of those of workmen. But whoever imagines, upon this account, that masters
rarely combine, is as ignorant of the world as of the subject. Masters are always and
everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to raise the
wages of labour above their actual rate. To violate this combination is everywhere a most
unpopular action, and a sort of reproach to a master among his neighbours and equals.
We seldom, indeed, hear of this combination, because it is the usual, and one may say,
the natural state of things, which nobody ever hears of. Masters, too, sometimes enter into
particular combinations to sink the wages of labour even below this rate. These are
always conducted with the utmost silence and secrecy, till the moment of execution, and
when the workmen yield, as they sometimes do, without resistance, though severely felt
by them, they are never heard of by other people.34
This remarkable passage illustrates three propositions that modern libertarians have either
forgotten or rejected: that employers “naturally” seek to combine in order to suppress wages; that
this behavior is common rather than rare; and that no one ever talks about it despite the powerful
interests and norms that bind employers.
Smith embraced the free market, but recognized markets that are monopolized or
cartelized are not free but are controlled by private actors. After Smith’s time, the antitrust laws
were developed to counter private market power in the spirit of Smith’s work. A century later,
Smith’s insights were corrupted by conservative economists who insisted that markets selfcorrect—a view that has curdled into a pro-big business “corporatocratic” view, and that with
every passing year becomes harder to sustain.35 Libertarians like Epstein should revive Smithian
principles and endorse stronger antitrust laws to protect markets of all kinds, including labor
markets. (And even if Epstein is correct that “over-enforcement” of antitrust law occurs in some
economic sectors, that cannot possibly be a concern for the application of antitrust law to labor
markets, as the history of underenforcement, bordering on non-enforcement, is more than a
century old, and has hardly diminished in the last few years of ramped-up activity.)
The idea that labor-side antitrust law could appeal to today’s warring political factions
might seem like a fantasy, but developments over the last decade indicate that this agenda may
have legs. While Obama-era antitrust policy was restrained and indeed frequently criticized as
excessively influenced by Chicago-school thinking,36 it was the Obama Justice Department that
sued the Silicon Valley tech companies37 and issued the first guidance document warning firms
against no-poaching agreements;38 and it was the Obama White House that first declared that
34
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labor monopsony was an antitrust problem.39 One might have expected the populist-conservative
Trump administration to curb this agenda, but the Antitrust Division under Trump issued the first
criminal indictments of executives for committing labor-side antitrust violations.40 And now the
Biden administration, under the influence of progressives, has announced that labor-side antitrust
will be an enforcement priority.41 Labor-side antitrust law is firmly based on theory and
evidence, enough to appeal to policymakers from across the political spectrum. Epstein should
join others in supporting it.
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